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Summary 
The First Part of this study has an introductory character. To that end the 
occasion for undertaking this study is sketched and furthermore the most 
important clements are (at this point sometimes rather summarily) described. 
The most important matter in chapter one is the statement of the problem to 
be treated in the study: which legal guarantees should be observed when tech-
nical-scientific expertise is sought with respect to the granting of environ-
mental licences? This question not only concerns a study of environmental 
law; the chosen approach purports to allow conclusions to be drawn for ad-
ministrative law in a general sense. As far as environmental law is concerned 
the granting of licences pursuant to the Environment Act' will have a central 
position. 
On the basis of this statement of the problem it is not the intention to embark 
on a quest for ways of increasing the contribution made by technical-scienti-
fic expertise in the decision-making process - at least, not without more. The 
starting-point is rather concerned with qualitative issues: what role should the 
expertise have in the decision-making process? In this regard there are two 
assumptions of primary importance. First, the lack of objectivity and the 
(fundamentally) uncertain character of technical-scientific expertise. Further-
more the undesirability that the administration and the judiciary assert a claim 
to a 'super-expertise', according to which the appearance is created of an 
objective and sound basis to the decisions taken. 
The implicit proposition is, in this connection, that if these two assumptions 
prove correct, this must have consequences for the specific legal safeguards 
concerned with the obtaining of expertise. In order to avoid overlooking one 
single safeguard, a broad approach to the research is preferable: the idea of 
rational decision-making. The first assumption can be tested against this idea, 
in particular with theories on scientific rationality. Moreover theories on 
rational decision-making can perhaps indicate which tack to take in dealing 
with scientific uncertainty. 
It is a primary concern that this study should result in pronouncements of 
practical relevance to at least four matters: pronouncements concerning 
responsibility for the obtaining of expertise, concerning the necessity to 
obtain expert advice, concerning procedural guarantees, and concerning the 
taking account of technical-scientific uncertainties. 
1. Heroafter referred too as EA. 
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In the second chapter the provisions of environmental law, which are central 
to this this study, are more specifically indicated. First it is the intention to 
demonstrate the great extent to which the environmental question - as the em-
pirical site of action for environmental law - confronts society with technical-
scientific problems. Two very important characteristics emerge from the 
sketch: the ecological and the technical-dynamic character of the environmen-
tal question. In respect of both characteristics the environmental question is, 
to a considerable extent, becoming increasing subject to scientific influence. 
If we link this fact to the fear of extensive and irreversible harm to (parts of) 
the inhabited environment, then the interest in a good environment compri-
ses, in terms of decision-making, a complex interest. 
In the wake of this finding the provisions of positive environmental law are 
studied more closely. In the light of the technical complexity of the environ-
mental question, it must first and foremost - following Waismann - be poin-
ted out that it is impossible to give complete and definitive descriptions of 
empirical reality. only incomplete and provisional, so-called 'open' descripti-
ons can be given. This position is entirely in accordance with the given 
characterisation of environmental law as well as with the deployment of open 
provisions in environmental law. 
A number of these provisions will suhsequently be described. First, a number 
of open public law environmental provisions, including hasic rights, licences, 
duties of care and environmental crimes. Suhsequently also the open private 
law provision of liability in tort - which is also of importance for environ-
mental law - requires attention. By way of contrast it is remarkable that there 
is a tendency, in certain cases, to use specifically closed provisions, which 
include the so-called 'general provisions'. 
The conclusion of the second chapter is that in environmental law the prevai-
ling question is of a continuous progression in the setting of norms. The risk, 
on the one hand, of extensive and irreversible environmental damage and, on 
the other hand, the ecological and technological-dynamic characteristics, 
make certain that such is the case. The necessity for open and continuous set-
ting of norms is the paradigm of environmental law. As a complement to this 
paradigm, the role of environmental law revealed in case law will remain of 
vital importance. 
In the third chapter it is investigated what points of departure are afforded for 
a legal analysis and evaluation of the contribution of expertise in case of open 
(environmental law) provisions. Openness of provisions necessitates, accor-
ding to the starting-point of this chapter, the amassment of knowledge. Two 
forms of openness should be distinguished: openness in terms of the conditi-
ons under which a power may be applied and openness in terms of the choice 
whether, and if so, how, a power will be used. The associated terms, margin 
of appreciation and discretion are described. Suhsequently the role of exper-
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tise in evaluation and in the weighing up of interests is investigated. In both 
cases it is necessary to establish the facts and that is just the occasion upon 
which the obtaining of expertise can be desirahle. 
In evaluation the administrative duty to establish the facts flows from the 
legality principle (are the conditions of application satisfied?). The establish-
ment of the facts is enmeshed into a process of interpretation and characteri-
sation. Art. 3:2 Administrative Law Code: provides a valuable gauge for the 
obtaining of expertise. The administration's special responsibility for the 
establishment of the facts furthermore sterns from the duty to weigh up 
various interests. The recognition and evaluation of interests plays a large 
part in this process. An important part of this work concerns the comparison 
of alternative decision-making options. Art. 3:2 ALC provides, also in this 
sphere of operation, an important measure for the collecting of information. 
Additionally Art. 3:4 ALC in particular plays a primary role. 
In evaluation and in the weighing up of interests the authority charged with 
establishing the facts is confronted with uneertainty as to the facts. Two 
tornis of uneertainty can be distinguished: uneertainty of principle and practi-
cal uneertainty. Uneertainty of principle is unavoidably present in all our 
perceptions: we can never say with certainty whether we, in our theories, 
have explained the empirical reality in an adequate and accurate way. Practi-
cal uneertainty places a more concrete pressure upon decision-making: some-
times the theories eonsidered necessary are lacking and there is (aceordingly) 
said to be a lack of information. 
Against this background the evaluation and weighing up of interests in the 
grant of EA-licences will be analysed. In this analysis it will beeome appa-
rent at which points it is necessary for the administration to obtain informati-
on in order to establish the relevant facts. 
In the second part of this study points of departure for rational decision-
making will be sought. This will be done in the fourth chapter, in which, fol-
lowing Snellen four sorts of rationality are distinguished: political, legal, 
economie and scientific. 
Scientific rationality receives central attention, since the assumptions concer-
ning scientific rationality form the basis of the present study. The investigati-
on of scientific rationality includes further an analysis of the uneertainty of 
principle discussed in chapter three. Practical uneertainty is subsequently 
eonsidered under the heading of economie rationality. Finally, under the 
heading of legal rationality, some consequences emerging from the iïndings 
2. The administrative Law Code will hereafter be referred too as ALC. The Code consists of three 
parts. The first two paris should he impleinenled on 1 January 1994. The third part is still in the 
dra ft stage. 
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will be set down in the form of a number of rules of thumb for rational 
decision-making. 
The assumptions made in the first chapter in respect of scientific rationality 
are confirmed. We have to accept that, as a result of under-determination, 
our theories will always be fundamentally uncertain. In the light of this fact 
values are of great importance for the choice of theories in carrying out 
scientific work. Accordingly the appearance is created of scientific rationality 
as a contingent social consensus. Also a more positive vision is possible. 
Scientific work leads, as the product of a successful group, to an ever increa-
sing capacity for resolving puzzles. In that sense there can indeed be said to 
be scientific progress. In so doing non-scientific values, measurement- and 
calculation errors can be elimated in the scientific practice. Agreement can 
perhaps be reached in respect of the application of particular values and in 
that sense can even be spoken of 'objectivity'. Above all, the exercise of 
criticism in an open debate between concerned parties is essential to the 
practice of scienee. 
Economie rationality is linked in this chapter with practical uncertainty. This 
type of uncertainty obstructs a rational-synoptic manner of decision-making. 
As an alternative the applicability of the satisfactory solution theory (Simon) 
to the laying down of legal norms is investigated. This leads to a 'theory' of 
legally satisfactory decision-making in three steps (select, investigate and 
examine). lt is implicit in this 'theory' that the requirements of care and 
reasonableness have a relative sphere of application - referring to 'alternati-
ves which should reasonably be considered', 'reasonable certainty' with 
respect to the facts and the 'not unproportional' character of decisions. The 
endeavour to reduce uncertainty is also accommodated within this theory. 
It is essential, for legal rationality, to secure confidence in the law. For the 
legitimation of legal norms it is desirable that they are the product of an 
(inasfar possible) open debate. This does not only apply to legislation enacted 
by parliament but also to administrative decision-making to implement parlia-
mentary statutes. In addition to procedural justification legitimation of the 
contents is desirable. Opinions about democracy and human rights can have 
an important role to play in that connection. 
Subsequently, five rules of thumb can be formulated to achieve legal rational 
decision-making in cases in which uncertainty is present. These are, respecti-
vely: administrative responsibility, the satisfying decision, the openness of 
decision-making, current opinions and criticism and working with values. 
These five rules will be used as points of reference thereafter in this study. 
Finally there are a number of practical points of importance: when should 
expert advice be sought, the unequivocality of available kwowledge, apparent 
certainties, the expert, the independence of experts and the different kinds of 
advice. Following upon this, for a number of normative choices with regard 
434 
to the establishment of the facts it will be investigated what approach should 
be expected of the administration. In this context the importance of admini-
strative responsibility for all aspects of the establishment of the facts must be 
emphasised anew. As a result of the discussion of practical questions, some 
other rules of thumb also require refinement. 
The third part of this study contains an investigation into the legal guarantees 
in respect of the seeking of expertise in the non-contentious procedure. Pri-
mary in this investigation is a pyramidal approach: first it will be considered 
whether the requirement of rational decision-making can be considered to be 
a guiding requirement in public law, then more specific guarantees to be 
found in the general part of administrative law will be investigated, and 
finally there is an analysis of some guarantees, specific to environmental law, 
in respect of the approach to expert advice. Where possible, findings will be 
compared with the rules of thumb discussed in the second part of the study. 
Chapter five revolves - in the sketched plan - around the question whether 
rational decision-making can be viewed as a requirement of lawful administ-
ration. The first approach is to investigate what administrative law actually 
can offer. To this end a link is made to Van der Hoeven's 'three dimensions 
of administrative law': legitimacy of the governing power, instrumentation 
and the imposition of normative limits. Because this study is primarily con-
cerned with guarantees, the most attention is given to judicial review of 
administrative action (in the broad sense). First of all reference will be made 
to the opinion of Van der Hoeven that 'micro-administration' requires an in-
dependent judicial supervision. In passing it will furthermore be pointed out 
that the idea of democracy, because of the stress placed upon the public 
forming of opinion, can contribute to rational decision-making - if constituti-
onal guarantees are observed. 
A more penetrating analysis follows, based upon Van Male's 'rationality 
postulate' and Nicolaï's 'evident rationality'. Although the vision which those 
authors give of the emergence of unwritten guarantees as carriers of a relati-
vist idea of rationality is enlightening, in their analyses precisely the limits of 
the requirement of rational decision-making are insufficiently emphasised. In 
this study the tension between the promotion of the general interest and the 
individual Hberty of citizens is taken as a starting-point. In this context the 
poiitical will to exercise power, as long as it enjoys legitimacy through de-
mocracy, is identifted as an indispensible driving-force in the governmental 
administration. Judicial restrictions upon this will, in order to protect indivi-
dual liberties, are necessary, but at such level that room remains for the 
driving-force to remain effective. This leads to the proposition that the prohi-
bition against arbitrariness fulfills the role of setting the tone. Prohibition of 
arbitrariness (in the broad sense) is described, following upon the above, as 
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the paradigm of administrative law; an unwritten generic principle which sets 
the outer boundaries of the exercise of politica) power. This prohibition upon 
arbitrariness both upholds and limits the requirement of rational decision-
making. More specifically this implies that the reiativism in the modern idea 
of rationality can be expressed in the requirements of open decision-making 
and in the prohibition against irrational actions. In respect of the contribution 
of expertise two important aspects are pointed out: the correcting of inaccura-
cies (including also the criticism and making available for criticism of (draft-) 
decisions), and the requirement of a legally satisfying decision. 
In the sixth chapter specific guarantees in the general part of administrative 
law are sought. The starting-point is that the legal guarantees connected to 
the non-contentious procedure, linked to democratie legitimacy, should con-
tribute to a 'public law legitimacy' of administrative decisions. This opinion 
is a logical sequel to the proposition that also micro-administration requires 
its own legitimation and an independent control. Simultaneously this underli-
nes the independant and 'substantive' importance of the non-contentious 
procedure. 
The observance of unwritten principles of law provides the foundations of 
public law legitimacy. In particular the prohibition against arbitrariness in the 
broad sense (as generic principle) is - again - mentioned, and in the light of 
the expertise prohlem, also three species-principles are mentioned: the prohi-
bition against arbitrariness (in the narrow sense), the duty of care and the 
duty to give reasons. 
The ALC procedures constitute important (positive) results or effects of 
(aspects of) the principles mentioned. Accordingly the general Standard 
procedure, the (extended) public preparatory procedure and the notice of 
objection procedure under the ALC are discussed. One of the conclusions 
flowing therefrom is the rejection of the idea of an (almost) generally-requi-
red notice of objection in the form of extended decision-making. This choice 
fails to recognise the importance of non-contentious decision-making as a 
form of open consultation, preceding the taking of an - in principle at least -
final decision. The proposal is made to always use two steps in the non-
contentious decision-making: first an intention or request stage and then a 
draft stage. From this follows the possibility of (contentious) appeal in two 
(factual) instances. Another conclusion is that the care for the expertise of the 
citizen appears to be rather limited. Although in the non-contentious procedu-
re (in principle) a heavy burden of proof must not be placed upon the indivi-
dual, it seems wise nevertheless, in certain cases, to provide for expert 
support. 
Subsequently the specific rules on the giving of advice are more closely 
studied. As far as specific advice is concerned this takes place in three sta-
ges: obtaining expert advice, rendering expert advice available for criticism 
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(prevention and control) and the authoritativeness of expert advisors. In the 
conclusion in this part the rules of thumb mentioned in the fourth chapter 
again apear. First of all the administrative responsibility for the advice; the 
administration must establish limiting conditions and carry out a murginal 
review (reasonableness and carefulness). Secondly, the advice (if the basis 
for the preparatory research) must deal with all essential clements, albeit 
within the limits of a satisfactory decision. Thirdly, the great importance of 
the abiiity to check and review the advice, particularly by way of the right to 
participation, is considered. In this context the point about supporting the 
expertise of ordinary citizens is reiterated. Fourthly, the question is conside-
red whether an expert advice must always represent the (most) prevailing 
scientific vision. Also, hearing in mind the risk of contradictory advice, the 
desirability of a fixed, independent advisor and a 'worst-case scenario' is 
discussed. Fifthly and lastly the importance of independente of an advisor is 
considered. 
The so-called guidelines are essential when one is concerned with general 
advice. After a short description of the reasons for laying down guidelines, 
about those who develop guidelines and the legal authority of guidelines 
(when may they be departed from?), there comes an evaluation. In the evalu-
ation the primary consideration is that the persuasiveness of guidelines must, 
in every case, be critically examined. It is necessary to have separate regard 
to each element - scientific basis, interpretation of vague terms and policy 
choices. With respect to policy choices in guidelines a court must take ac-
count of the freedom to form policy which is entrusted to administrative 
organs. In the light of the policy choices a court should, at the same time, to 
be watchful for the independence of the maker of the guidelines. In respect 
of the technical-scientific aspect of the guideline, a comparison with the 
expert advice can be made. In particular it should be considered whether the 
guideline is supported by a technical basis of (proved and tested) quality and 
whether account should be taken of new insights or special circumstances in 
the particular case. The administration should always specifically make it 
possible (via participation) for contradictory expertise to be introduced. 
In the conclusion to chapter six again the importance of openness is decision-
making is stressed. Also the demerits of the obligatory notice-of-objection 
procedure and the lack of attention for the expertise of interested citizens will 
be considered. Furthermore, emphasis will be placed, with a view to the 
giving of advice, upon the administration's own responsibility, the require-
ment to make a satisfactory decision, the independence of the advisor, the 
distinctiveness and degree of insight offered by expert advice, and the neces-
sity for a critical attitude (and, connected thereto, the possible role of perma-
nent advisors). The chapter closes with a number of points requiring further 
attention subsequently in the study. 
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In chapter seven the search tbr legal guarantees in the obtaining of expert 
evidence is focussed upon environmental law. This concerns, in particular, 
four subjects: the Environmental Impact Assessment3, making provision for 
the expertise of citizens, the input of permanent experts and a number of 
leads to reducing uncertainty. 
The EIA is discussed at some length, exactly because it is pretended to be a 
'rational decision-making procedure' in which the input of technical-expertise 
plays an important role. In discussing the EIA-procedure and the sphere of 
operation of the EIA, the evaluation by the EA-Evaluation Committee4 plays 
an important role. Also the government's report evaluating the EIA will be 
considered. In conclusion three points are considered. 
First the separation of responsibility. The attitude of the government that the 
EIA-comittee should confine itself to the giving of advice - even if the com-
petent authority is also the initiative-taker - deserves support. The openness 
of decision-making should be able to guarantee that the administration takes 
adequate account of the advice of the EIA-committee. The separation of 
responsibility should, besides, imply that if an Environmental Impact State-
ment'* is accepted by the competent authority, any later adjustments to the 
EIS which becoome necessary should be the primary responsibility of the 
administration. Accordingly, following the proposal of the ECW, a reversal 
of the third and fourth steps in the EIA-procedure (evaluation of the accepta-
bility of the EIS -consultation and examining EIS) should be brought into 
effect. First the EIA-committee should give its advice, and thereafter the 
administration should decide the question of acceptability of the EIS. In this 
perspective it is evident that the person taking initiative can be required to 
make adjustments between these two steps. The procedural objections of the 
government in this respect are not convincing. It is, however, correct that 
this approach requires decision-making in two steps, hut in chapter six it has 
already been stated that it is desirable that the non-contennsious procedure be 
split into intention and a draft phases; in this vision the procedural objections 
fall away. 
Secondly, the EIA-procedure can contribute to the formation of open norms 
in environmental law. Art. 7.35 EA has the effect that the competent autho-
rity must reflect upon the technical and social adequacy of the norms laid 
down. From this point-of-view the risk of serious environmental damage is 
not only the basis for the obligation to deploy EIA, but also for an open link 
to 'continued setting of norms'. 
3. Hereafter refenvd ioo as EIA. 
4. Hercaftcr referred loo as ECW. 
5. Heivafter referred loo as EIS. 
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The conclusion is that the EIA-procedure fits in well with the theory of the 
satisfactory decision. In this connection the seiection of alternatives to he 
investigated in connection with the laying down of guidelines are particularly 
striking. By way of conclusion it can be stated, in accordance with the ECW 
and the government, that the EIA-provision is a reasonably (not to mention 
'satisfactorily') functioning instrument. 
The second subject in this chapter is the care tbr the expertise of citizens. In 
decision-making in marters of technical complexity, the way should be paved, 
also substantively, tbr openness or access to the debate in respect of the 
decision to be taken. The administration not only has a duty of care to provi-
de citizens with relevant information, but also to place citizens in the position 
to consult an independent expert. The 'exchange of ideas' in Art. 3:25 first 
section ALC seems to provide a possible point of reference. At the same time 
the starting-point in the non-contentious procedure must remain that a citizen 
only has to provide the initial initiative to the ohtaining of evidente. Too 
generous provisions would result in an increase in the burden of proof laid 
upon citizens in non-contentious procedures. 
Furthermore chapter seven contains a plea tor the creation of a general right 
in independent experts to give advice in technically complicated decision-
making. Thus the provision of contradictory expertise can be institutionally 
guaranteed. This could be achieved through the creation of an organisation 
with regional branches. In this connection two 'instances', the EIA-committee 
and the Environmental Hygiëne Inspection Service, are compared. This com-
parison reveals that the Inspection Service does not meet the required stand-
ards of independence. As far as the content of the advice is concerned it is 
established that such advices should not only be concerned with technical 
insight but also with the task set by the legislature (in particular to strive tbr 
the highest possible level of protection of the environment). 
Finally the legal points of departure tbr the reduction of uncertainty will be 
considered. In that connection will be considered: the openness of decision-
making, the comparison of alternatives, the making explicit of gaps in know-
ledge, the ALARA- and principle of taking precautions, evaluation, the duty 
to keep up to date, compensation provisions and insurance. 
The fourth part of the study is concerned with safeguarding the (non-conten-
tious) guarantees. This is an issue which invokes the question how the admi-
nistrative court treats (the input by) expertise. This question will be discussed 
in two steps. First the function of the administrative judge will be considered. 
It is, namely, interesting to consider trom which point-of-view, in which 
way, and to what extent that administrative judge should engage in the esta-
blishment of the facts. Moreover it is interesting to examine the establishment 
of facts itself and the role of the factor expertise in that process. The aim of 
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the research and the rules of evidence in administrative law are, in this mat-
ter, especially of immportance. 
Chapter eight begins with a sketch of the contours of the new administrative 
procedural law. The choice for the judicial review function of administrative 
procedure is expressly approved. At the same time the starting-point of 
autonomy of the parties is accepted. This starting-point does, however, ex-
pressly leaves room for application of 'compensation for inequality' by the 
administrative court - particularly through the possibility of supplementing 
the legal grounds of the claim and the facts. 
An important matter is the relationship between the non-contentious and the 
contentious procedure. The point-of-departure is that the court must avoid 
performing unnecessary or unrequested activities which are precisely belon-
ging to the non-contentious procedure. In support of this perspective it is 
(once again) pointed out that the non-contentious procedure also has a demo-
cratie character and the character of offering the individual judicial protection 
against the administration. Several features are expressed in the open proce-
dure in which consultation can take place about the decision to be taken in its 
entirety (having regard to all possible consequences). In this process the 
endeavour to achieve optimal individual administration of justice is primary. 
This includes the endeavour to accord effective respect to interests affected -
in specie rather than in financial terms. In this context it is appropriate for 
the judge to contribute to the possibilities of taking decisions, in a non-con-
tentious manner, which are as fully as possible adjusted to the situation. It is 
entirely in accordance with this approach that, for practical reasons, in admi-
nistrative law the disputed administrative decision is identitied as the object 
of dispute and that the court, if the decision turns out to be unlawful, can 
quash the decision. In this regard there is a point of principle at play to the 
extent that, the decision having been quashed, the administration cannot 
escape its responsibility to take a new decision. 
Furthermore express attention is drawn to the margin of appreciation connec-
ted with the establishment of the facts by the administration. In connection 
herewith the court has to proceed on the basis of the primacy of the administ-
ration in establishing the facts. Accordingly the court must conduct a substan-
tive review of the establishment of the facts by the administration according 
to the test of 'objective reasonableness'. 
Following from this approach the desirability (not to mention, permissibility) 
for the court to take the decision itself requires attention. If and insofar 
administrative discretion is at issue - and the presumption is that such will be 
the case in respect of the facts (the normative choices) - the court should not 
take the decision itself. Also the public effect of decisions and the decision 
whether to set the decision aside or to quash it completely constitute a limita-
tion for the courts to take the decisions themselves. The kernal of the discus-
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sion in the eighth chapter is the protection of the value of the non-contentious 
procedure as well as the concern tor an excessive trust in (the capacity of) 
judicial resul ution of disputes. On balance therefore it is argued that in the 
case of judicial review the primacy of the administration in establishing the 
facts and the criterium of 'objective reasonableness' come to the fore. Con-
cerning the question whether the court should take the decision itself the 
restriction to taking measures with a 'relative' character seems to offer a 
practical guarantee tbr respect tor administrative discretion. Last but not least 
attention is (again) drawn to the importance of judicial decisions at two 
instances - exactly (also) because it concerns technicaliy complicated dispu-
tes. 
Chapter nine, apart from a short outline of the contentious procedure, gives 
central attention to the law of evidence in administrative law. First the role of 
the administrative judge as dominus litis is considered, more specifically as 
resigned but active judge. In the light of the great judicial influence upon the 
proceedings, considerable importance is attached to the ability to criticise and 
control judicial decisions - in connection with which the desirability of a 
judicial decision at two instances must be recalled. There is, above all, rea-
son tor concern about the ability to criticise the judicial decision to commissi-
on research to be undertaken by experts. Art. 8:47 ALC offers the parties to 
the proceedings little consolation. It is to be feared that the judge in techni-
caliy complicated cases will make an autonomous decision to commission 
expert research, by which - notwithstanding all the autonomy of the parties -
such a broad term of reference will be given that it will all too quickly beco-
me a complete re-establishment of the facts - notwithstanding all the garan-
tees in non-contentious proceedings. Therefore a stronger position of the 
parties to the proceedings in the stage proceeding research is to be recom-
mended. 
On the basis of a short discussion of the 'new-style permanent-expert-proce-
dure' the issue of the dualism of the judge and expert again emerges. Here 
the point of view formulated in the first rule of thumb is appropriate: in-
house technical expertise is userul (and to a certain minimum would appear 
even necessary), but in-house expertise must not become the sole basis for 
legitimating an (administrative or) 
judicial judgment. 
The law of evidence in administrative law is subsequently more closely in-
vestigated by studying the problem of the scope of the evidence, the distri-
bution of burden of proof, the various sorts of evidence and the evaluation of 
the evidence. At the outset it must be pointed out that the determination of 
the substantive truth - as primary objective - is embedded in a number of 
normative propositions which are connected with the function of the procedu-
re and the role of the parties therein. 
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In respect of the scope of the evidence the court, given the judicial review 
element, will have to take party autonomy seriously. On this basis the court 
should abstain from any integral re-investigation of the facts on its own 
initiative. The parties to the procedure should be given the opportunity as 
early as possible in the proceedings to make their views of the facts known. 
Also in the distribution of the burden of proof the autonomy of the parties 
should make itself feit. The court could, however, by way of compensation 
for the (negative) inequality of the citizen who is party to the proceedings, 
bear part of the burden of proof. Furthermore the presumption of lawfulness 
is an important gage to the distribution of burden of proof between the par-
ties. As well as in the 'porchway' to the production of evidence, the motiva-
ting of the appeal and in the pre-procedural explanation given by the defen-
ding administrative body, as well as in real leading of evidence this presumti-
on with the compensation for inequality plays an important role. Moreover it 
appears a good idea to resist the temptation to apply the maxim 'he who 
makes a proposition, must prove it'; the pattern of distribution of burden of 
proof is distinctly too capricious for that. 
In the matter of the various sorts of evidence the defence principle is of great 
importance. The parties to the proceedings must have the opportunity to 
express their views on all procedural documents relevant to the judicial 
decision. In technically complicated disputes the possibility to call contra-
expertise should be the rule. On the subject of expertise, expert reports are 
particularly interesting. In this respect the experience with official reports in 
environmental disputes is instructive. From this experience it becomes appa-
rent the extent to which it is necessary to guard against undermining of the 
judge's position as dominus litis and for automatically going for re-examinati-
on of the facts. In this light it seems advisable to opt for giving advice to the 
judge on an ad hoc basis. Such advice should be directed to specifïc questi-
ons, after the parties have been given the opportunity to provide evidence 
themselves. In any event the parties should have the possibility, as originally 
suggested by the government, to give their opinion of the terms of advice 
requested of the expert. With such an approach there is no need to fear for 
Standard re-examination of the facts, nor for infringement of the autonomy of 
the parties; the administration can immediately be held accountable for its 
'pre-procedural burden of proof. In this way the judge can realise his passi-
ve but active role to the ruil, and the non-contentious procedure retains its 
independent value. 
Finally the evaluation of evidence is considered. The independent position of 
the judge is evident in this. Therefore the phenomenon of ' convincing the 
court' requires attention. In that connection the desirability of a critical 
judicial attitude comes quickly to the fore. In the interests of clarity: 'convin-
cing the court' does not mean that uncertainty can be eliminated in the lea-
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ding of evidence. The point is to attain the legally required level of certainty: 
namely, 'reasonable certainty'. In the case of vulnerable interests the burden 
of proof will be heavier - tbr the administration, but in consequence also tbr 
the opposing citizen. The motivation tbr the judicial evaluation of the eviden-
ce is then very important. Especiaily when it concerns a judgment about 
methodological criticism. In this context the desirability of a right to intro-
ducé contra-expertise and case law in two judicial instances is (again) indi-
cated. Finally the pros and cons of formalising evidence must be considered. 
An important point is the proposition that the administration may decide, in 
some circumstances, on the basis of new insights, to depart from or to sup-
plement the formal rules of evidence. 
In the last and fifih part of the study (chapter ten) it is time, with the assis-
tance of a summary of the matters which emerged in the earlier parts of the 
study, to reach certain conclusions and recommendations. 
In this context it is attractive to bring attention once more to the formulation 
of the problem: which legal safeguards should be observed when technical-
scientific evidence is obtained in applications tbr environmental licences? 
By way of conclusions there are five points which require further attention. 
First, the insight that the problem of expertise is not so much a question of 
more or less expertise (quantative analysis), but much more the question how 
'to work with' expertise (qualitative analysis). 
Second, the importance of a specific 'public law legitimation' of the work 
done by the administration requires attention. Here the non-contentious 
procedure plays an essential role, especiaily in the light of democratie cali-
bre, the administration of justice to individuals (judicial review) and the 
technical-substantive quality of the decision-making. Here the opportunity for 
reciprocal argumentative influence by the concerned bodies and individuals is 
of vital importance. In that regard a two-phase procedure must be chosen 
(intention and draft) which is a departure from the present notice of objection 
procedure. In the procedure the substantive equality between the various 
bodies and individuals must be regarded. Although the administration prima-
rily has responsibility for the establishment of the facts, whereas an opposing 
citizen 'only' has to indicate his or her interest, it is desirable, in technically 
complicated decision-making, to make provision for technical-expert support 
for third parties. 
The crucial role of the non-contentious procedure has consequences for the 
contentious proceedings concerning the administration. It must be avoided 
that the court undermines the non-contentious guarantees. In particular po-
wers of judicial review and judicial rulings must take account of the opportu-
nity given to the administration in the establishment of the facts. 
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Thirdly, it cannot be stressed enough that it is impossible to achieve certainty 
in respect of the facts. Legally speaking only 'reasonable certainty' can be 
required of the administration. Neither the administration nor the court 
should pretend to a 'super-expertise'. The point is not to find the greatest 
expertise but to create knowledge which is open to criticism. In this respect 
the administration fulfills legally a pivotal function, which implies that nor-
mative choices are made. 
Fourth, the paradigm of progressive setting of norms requires attention. The 
connected creation of open norms is apparent in many places: in the license 
system, the duties of care, the extended competence to make decisions, the 
duty to bring things up to date, the guidelines and the the legal concepts 
derived from the Civil Code. Progressive laying down of norms is the basis 
for the role of the expert in environmental law. Progression of norms does 
not detract from the fact that it must be realised when decisions are taken that 
we are only able to make 'satistactory decision'. The point is to make a 
decision which is, from a legal point of view, rationally acceptable, but being 
fully aware that decisions once taken may require revision in the light of later 
acquired insights. 
Finally there are still the rules of thumb. Actually it coinsists of a collection 
of points-of-departure with an heuristic function. With hindsight the guideli-
nes provide a peg upon which to hang the summary of the study. 
At the last stage in the study it is attractive to inventarise the recommendati-
ons made within the study. It is useful to approach this task from the point of 
view of the various actors in the process of establishing norms: citizens, the 
administration, judge and the expert. Consideration of the position of the 
expert provokes the following remarks. In this study the model of the expert-
authority, who unilaterally and more-or-less without being vulnerable to 
contradiction reaches a (binding) expert-conclusion, is expressly rejected. On 
the contrary an open, argumentative model is preferred. It follows from this 
choice that some form of measure must be found for the degree of certainty 
(or minimal required knowledge), and 'buffers' must be considered with a 
view to preventing or managing damage attributable to technical-scientific 
mistakes. The open model for working with expertise will (in the longer 
term) serve to promote confidence in the laying down of norms and in the 
protection of vulnerable interests. It implies for techically complicated decisi-
on-making that there is no easy way out. Decision-making will do well to 
take place on the basis of 'the praise of criticism'. 
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